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Internet File Sharing:  
The Liability of the Host and The Users 
Tat Chi Chio 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The Internet is one of the most important innovations in the Twentieth Century.  It 
facilitates communication between people around the world by rapid, accurate, and 
inexpensive distribution of information.  A person with a personal computer and Internet 
connection can communicate with people from around the world anytime and anywhere.  
With this capability, the person can disseminate and/or receive information instantly. 
In the mid-1960’s, the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) began 
developing data networks that would connect computers together so that scientists could 
share computers.  Leonard Kleinrock was instrumental in the development of the 
government-supported data network called the ARPANET that would use the technology 
that is known as “packet switching” today.  On October 29, 1969, the first Host-to-Host 
message was sent on the Internet from UCLA to Stanford Research Institute.
1
    
                                                            
1 www.lk.cs.ucla.edu/Personal_history.html 
Based on the Internet’s structure, several powerful and efficient information 
exchange technology have been developed: Peer-to-Peer network, File-Hosting service, 
and Video-Sharing websites.  Because these technologies are cutting-edge, the legal 
responsibility of the providers of these technologies and their users is still an unknown 
area for each of the parties.  In this paper, we are going to explore the legal responsibility 
of each of the parties.  
2. Background 
File sharing between individuals within a computer network was developed by 
Sun Microsystems for their UNIX system.
2
  The advantage of sharing digital copies of 
files over distribution of physical copies of the same files is that the information can be 
distributed more rapidly and easily.
3
  The advent of the Internet and file transfer protocol 
(“FTP”) system allows sharing of information between individuals separated by great 
distance.
4
  A person with a valid password to the FTP website can download and copy 
files onto their computer for later use.
5
 
1. Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Technology 
In 1999, Shawn Fanning created peer to peer (P2P) file sharing software called 
“Napster” that allowed computer users to share music over the Internet.6  Napster enabled 
users to exchange songs through centralized computer servers.  After Napster was shut 
                                                            
2 See Howard  P. Goldberg, Note, A Proposal for an International Licensing Body to Combat File Sharing 
and Digital Copyright Infringement, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 272 (2002). 
3 See id. 
4 See id. 
5 See id. 
6 See Hayward, J., Grokster Unplugged: It’s Time to Legalize P2P File Sharing, Selected Works, 2007, located at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=john_hayward. 
down, other P2P file sharing programs emerged such as Kazaa, Grokster, Morpheus, and 
Streamcast.  They allowed users to exchange songs directly from one computer to another 
without employing a central server.
7
 
P2P file sharing programs allow a user’s computer to connect to a network, in 
which the computer initiates communication and responds to queries from other 
computers in the same network without going through an intermediate server.
8
  In a P2P 
network, users download files by querying the other users on the same network for a file 
of interest and requesting a copy of the file when the file is located.
9
  At the same time, 
users can respond to queries for files from other users on the same network.  If the 
queried user has the requested file on his/her computer, the computer can directly send a 
copy of the file to the querying user’s computer.10  On the other hand, a client-server 
communications architecture is employed in a non-P2P network.  A user computer 
connected to the network can only communicate with other user computers via the 
server.
11
 
Since computers connected to P2P networks can communicate with each other 
without a central server, they provide several advantages over the server-client 
architecture.  First, a breakdown of any peer in a P2P network would not seriously affect 
the operation of the network.  The contents are shared and stored between users without a 
central server.  Each computer in the network can act as a client or server for the other 
computers in the network.  Thus, there are numerous servers for a given peer requesting 
                                                            
7 See id. 
8 See Richard Swope, Comment, Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and Copyright Infringement: Danger Ahead for 
Individuals Sharing Files on the Internet, 44 Santa Clara L. Rev. 861 (2004). 
9 See id. 
10 See id. 
11 See id. 
files.  However, since the server in the server-client architecture controls all the contents, 
a breakdown of the server may result in the damage and loss of the contents.  Second, 
P2P networks provide a consumer-centered medium for users: every user can determine 
which content to share and control the schedule of operation.  Finally, P2P networks can 
handle a large number of users and offers a reliable, flexible, and inexpensive multimedia 
communications platform.
12
 
With the flexibility and convenience offered by P2P networks, copyright 
infringements are more likely to occur in P2P networks.  Since every computer connected 
to the network can act both as a client and a server, every user in the network can receive 
and distribute both copyrighted and un-copyrighted contents.  When users share 
copyrighted contents without permission, they are committing copyright infringements.  
In addition, because there is no central server, the ability to control access to copyrighted 
contents is limited.  Thus, P2P networks are easily used to commit copyright 
infringements.
13
 
BitTorrent is a P2P application that operates to share a huge file by dividing the 
file into small pieces.  When a peer downloads a file, it connects to BitTorrent’s 
centralized software called the tracker, which will return a list of peers that have the file.  
The download will establish connection with other peers simultaneously and downloads 
the pieces of the file from the peers who have them.  There are two types of peers in 
                                                            
12 See Chunhsien Sung and Po-Hsian Huang, Copyright Infringement and Users of P2P Networks in 
Multimedia Applications: The Case of the U.S. Copyright Regime, Peer-to-Peer Networking and 
Application, Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2012. 
13 See id. 
BitTorrent: seeds and downloaders.  The seeds are peers who have all the pieces of the 
file and the downloaders are peers who do not have all the pieces of the file.
14
 
2. One-Click Hosting Services 
In 2005, a new type of file sharing service has been developed such as 
MegaUpload and RapidShare.  They are commonly known as One-Click Hosting 
(OCH).
15
  These sites allowed users to share files through dedicated centralized servers 
without relying on an underlying P2P infrastructure.  A user is able to share large files 
with other users in the following steps: (1) upload the file on an OCH server through an 
upload website interface; (2) share the URL for the file provided by the OCH service 
with other users either publicly (e.g. post the URL on personal webpages or blogs) or 
privately (e.g. share the URL through email); (3) users can download the file through a 
download website interface by clicking on the URL.
16
 
OCH services provide several advantages over P2P networks.  First, files 
uploaded on OCH services are always available, whereas the files are available only 
when peers carrying the files are connected to the network.  Second, in OCH services, the 
IP addresses of the downloaders and uploaders are known only to the OCH services, 
whereas in P2P networks, peers have to disclose their IP addresses when they are 
uploading or downloading a file.  Third, less popular contents can be found more often on 
OCH services than in P2P networks.  Fourth, the performance of OCH services are higher 
than P2P networks.  Experiments show that a Premium RapidShare user receives higher 
                                                            
14 See Dongyu Qiu and R. Srikant.  Modeling and Performance Analysis of BitTorrent-Like Peer-to-Peer 
Networks, SIGCOMM’04 Aug. 30-Sept. 3, 2004. 
15 See Demetris Antoniades, Evangelos P. Markatos, and Constantine Dovrolis.  One-click Hosting Services: 
a File-sharing Hideout, In Proc. of ACM IMC ’09.  
16 See id. 
throughput than a BitTorrent user downloading the same file.  Finally, OCH services 
encourage users to upload more files by providing higher download throughput to 
frequent uploaders.  This results in more contents available in OCH services.
17
 
3. Video-sharing website: YouTube 
 Like P2P networks and OCH services, video-sharing website such as YouTube 
allows user to share contents on the Internet.  YouTube allows users to upload video 
contents and view video contents with their computer.  The major difference between 
YouTube and other file sharing technology is that YouTube users can view video 
contents without downloading them.
18
  Thus, YouTube users are able to view video 
contents on YouTube so long as their devices are connected to the Internet.
19
 
4. Liability of P2P network 
Before P2P file sharing, music lovers downloaded music from websites operated  
by the website owner.  In UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, users were able to access 
music recordings posted on MP3.com website by proving that they already owned the CD 
version of the recording or by purchasing the CD from one of defendant’s cooperating 
online retailers.  Then, the users could access the recordings with a computer from 
anywhere via the Internet.
20
   
The court rejected the defendant’s fair use and other defenses and held that the 
defendant has infringed plaintiff’s copyrights.  The court explained that, for the first 
                                                            
17 See id. 
18 See Lior Katz, Viacom v. YouTube: An Erroneous Ruling Based on the Outmoded DMCA, 31 Loy. L.A. 
Ent. L. Rev. 101 (2011). Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/elr/vol31/iss2/2 
19 See Id. 
20 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.COM, Inc., 92 F.Supp.2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
factor of the fair use, defendant’s “space shift” use of MP3.com was not transformative.  
It was essentially retransmitting unauthorized copies in another medium.  Moreover, 
defendant’s activities infringed plaintiff’s right to license the copyrighted sound 
recordings to others for reproduction.
21
  
Although P2P file sharing programs such as Napster provided many advantages 
over the client-server architecture, it also represented a huge threat to the music industry.  
Majority of the users shared copyrighted music by using Napster on the Internet without 
permission.
22
  In 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that 
plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on their infringement claims and upheld 
the district court’s preliminary injunction with modified scope.23 
1. The Napster Case 
 The Court of Appeals’ opinion discussed, among other things, (I) Napster’s 
contributory liability;
24
 (II) Napster’s vicarious liability;25 (III) applicability of Audio 
Home Recording Act;
26
 and (IV) Napster’s claim that it was entitled to the protection of 
the “safe harbor” under Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).27 
I. Contributory Liability 
Contributory liability requires that the defendant knew or have reason to know of 
direct infringement and materially contributes to the infringing activity.
28
  The Ninth 
                                                            
21 See id. at 351-353.  
22 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001).  
23 See id. 
24 See id. at 1020. 
25 See id. at 1022. 
26 See id. at 1024. 
27 See id. at 1025. 
28 See id. at 1020-1022.  
Circuit found that Napster had both actual and constructive knowledge of direct 
infringement.
29
  However, the court refused to “impute the requisite level of knowledge 
to Napster merely because peer-to-peer file sharing technology may be used to infringe 
plaintiffs’ copyrights.”30  For a computer system operator to have sufficient knowledge, 
the copyright holder must inform the computer system operator that infringing material is 
available on his system.  If the computer system operator fails to remove such materials 
after the copyright holder’s notice, the operator knows of and contributes to direct 
infringement.  However, the computer system operator cannot be liable for contributory 
infringement merely because the system allows for exchange of copyrighted material if 
there is no specific information that identifies infringing activity.
31
  Because Napster had 
actual knowledge that specific infringing material is available on its system and it failed 
to remove the material, Napster was found to have the knowledge requisite to 
contributory infringement.  The court also found that Napster materially contributed to 
the infringing activity.
32
  Because Napster had knowledge, both actual and constructive, 
of direct infringement and materially contributed to the infringing activity, the court 
concluded that plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of the 
contributory copyright infringement claim. 
 
                                                            
29 See id. at 1020.  Napster had actual knowledge because “(1) a document authored by Napster co-
founder Sean Parker mentioned ‘the need to remain ignorant of users’ real names and IP address since 
they are exchanging pirated music’; and (2) the Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”) 
informed Napster of more than 12,000 infringing files, some of which are still available.”  Napster had 
constructive knowledge because “(a) Napster executives have recording industry experience; (b) they 
have enforced intellectual property rights in other instances; (c) Napster executives have downloaded 
copyrighted songs from the system; and (d) they have promoted the site with ‘screen shots listing 
infringing files.’” 
30 See id. at 1020-1021. 
31 See id. at 1022. 
32 See id. 
II. Vicarious Liability 
To find a defendant liable for vicarious liability, it must be shown that the 
defendant has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and has a direct 
financial interest in such activities.
33
  Napster was found to have financial benefit because 
the availability of infringing material attracts customers and Napster’s future revenue is 
directly dependent upon the size in its user base.
34
  As for the supervision requirement, 
Napster retained the right to control access to its system because Napster expressly 
reserved the “right to refuse service and terminate accounts in its discretion.”  To escape 
vicarious liability, the reserved right to police must be exercised to its fullest extent.  The 
court concluded that even though Napster’s ability to police was limited by their system’s 
architecture, it had the ability to locate infringing material listed on its search indices and 
the right to terminate users’ access to the system.35  Therefore, based on the finding that 
Napster failed to police the infringing activity and its direct financial interest from such 
activity, the court concluded that plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on 
the merits of the vicarious liability. 
III. Defenses 
Napster raised the protection under Audio Home Recording Act (“AHRA”) and 
of the “safe harbor” from copyright infringement suits for Internet service providers 
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) as two of its defenses.36  The 
                                                            
33 See id. 
34 See id. at 1023. 
35 See id. at 1023-1024. 
36 See id. at 1024-1025. 
court rejected Napster’s AHRA defense37 and indicated that whether Napster was eligible 
for the section 512(d) safe harbor protection for service providers was an issue to be more 
fully developed at trial.  The undecided questions for determining whether Napster was 
eligible for the safe harbor protection includes: “ (1) whether Napster is an Internet 
service provider as defined by 17 U. S. C. 512(d); (2) whether copyright owners must 
give a service provider ‘official’ notice of infringing activity in order for it to have 
knowledge or awareness of infringing activity on its system; (3) whether Napster 
complies with 512(i), which requires a service provider to timely establish a detailed 
copyright compliance policy.” 
2. The Grokster case 
After Napster was shut down, other P2P file sharing programs emerged such as 
Kazaa, Grokster, Morpheus, and Streamcast.  Grokster and StreamCast did not use 
servers to intercept the content of the search requests or to mediate the file transfers by 
the users with the software.  They allowed users to exchange files directly from one 
computer to another.  Grokster and Streamcast were sued for copyright infringement.  
The suit was dismissed by the district court and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.  However, the 
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling.38 
The Ninth Circuit held that Grokster and Streamcast were not contributorily liable 
because the software was capable of substantial noninfringing uses.  They had no actual 
knowledge of the infringing activities because of the decentralized architecture of their 
                                                            
37 See id.  Napster’s AHRA defense failed because computers and their hard drives are not digital audio 
recording devices under the plain meaning of the AHRA’s definition because their primary purpose is not 
to make digital audio copied recordings.  Furthermore, computers do not make digital music recordings as 
defined by the AHRA. 
38 See MGM Studio Inc., v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 922. 
software.  Moreover, Grokster and Streamcast did not materially contribute to their users’ 
infringing activities because they did not provide search, retrieval, or storage of the 
infringing files.
39
 
The Ninth Circuit also held that Grokster and Streamcast were not vicariously 
liable because they did not have the power to control or supervise.  Grokster and 
Streamcast did not have the ability to monitor or control the use of the software, did not 
reserve the right to control the use of the software, and had no independent duty to police 
infringing activities.
40
  Based on these findings, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s ruling that Grokster and Sreamcast were not contributorily or vicariously liable.  
 The Supreme Court held that “one who distributes a device with the object of 
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative 
steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third 
parties.”41  In order not to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation 
having a lawful purpose, the Supreme Court also said that neither mere knowledge of 
infringing uses, potential or actual nor ordinary acts incident to product distribution 
would be sufficient to subject a distributor to liability.
42
  Evidence supported a finding of 
liability was identified by the Supreme Court.  First, both of Grokster and StreamCast 
advertised themselves as Napster’s replacement.  Their efforts to supply services to 
former Napster users indicate an intent on the part of each to bring about infringement.  
Second, Neither company attempted to develop any mechanism to reduce infringing 
activity using their software.  Third, their profits come from selling advertisement space, 
                                                            
39 See id. at 927-928. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. at 936-937. 
42 See id. 
by directing ads to the screens of computers running their software.  The more the 
software is used, the more ads are sent out and thereby the higher profits for them.
43
  
Because of substantial evidence showing Grokster and StreamCast’s intent to induce the 
users of their software to commit copyright infringement, the Supreme Court reversed the 
Ninth Circuit’s ruling in favor of Grokster and StreamCast. 
 Based on Napster and Grokster, the knowledge and inducement of infringing 
activities are the key component to attach liability to a P2P file sharing software 
distributor.  Thus, to avoid liability, the P2P file sharing software distributor must not 
maintain a central search index and not induce users to exchange copyrighted works 
without permission using the software.  
5. Liability of File-Hosting Service 
A second kind of file sharing technology is called file-hosting service or one-click 
hosting.  Examples of file-hosting service are RapidShare and MegaUpload.  As in the 
case of RapidShare, the users must register for a free account or acquire a premium 
account by paying a fee.  The registered users can upload files from her computer.  The 
servers automatically generate a download link (a URL) for each uploaded file and send 
the URL to the uploader.  The uploader can share the uploaded files with other users by 
sharing the URL.  RapidShare’s website does not offer a search function and does not 
have an index for files stored on its servers.
44
 
The district denied Perfect 10’s motion for preliminary injunction because Perfect 
10 did not establish that it is likely to succeed on the merit.  To find the defendant liable 
                                                            
43 See id. at 939-940. 
44 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. RapidShare A.G., Case No. 09-CV-2596 H at p. 2-3. 
for contributory infringement, the plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) has 
knowledge of another’s infringement and (2) either (a) materially contributes to45 or (b) 
induces that infringement.
46
  The district court concluded that RapidShare had actual, 
specific knowledge of direct infringement because RapidShare received notice of 
hundreds of copyrighted Perfect 10 images that were found on its servers.
47
   
However, the district court ruled that RapidShare did not materially contribute to 
the infringement because it did not index user materials and did not have a search 
function for the users to search for particular files.  Also, RapidShare was using 
information provided by Perfect 10 to locate and remove infringing images, and was 
taking independent steps to identify, locate, and remove infringing materials.
48
 
The district court also concluded that RapidShare did not induce users’ infringing 
activity.  There are a number of substantial lawful uses for the RapidShare service.
49
  
Also, RapidShare’s Condition of Use prohibit copyright infringement, and RapidShare 
removes infringing materials, terminates infringers’ accounts, and independent searches 
for and remove infringing materials when given takedown notices by copyright owners.
50
 
Therefore, because of the lack of sufficient evidence to prove that RapidShare 
materially contributed to the infringements of its uses and that RapidShare induced its 
                                                            
45 See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004. 
46 See MGM Studios Inc, v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913. 
47 See RapidShare, Case No. 09-CV-2596 H at p. 7-8. 
48 See id.  at 8-10. 
49 See id.  at 10-11.  “For example, RapidShare provides users with a secure location to store and access 
files from anywhere that there is Internet access.  Additionally, RapidShare provides data storage capacity 
which may present businesses with an economical alternative to buying and maintaining their own 
storage-related computer hardware.  RapidShare has presented evidence that the German edition of PC 
world magazines has twice used RapidShare to host file of anti-virus software for its reader to download.  
Moreover, Plaintiff has not presented evidence to show that RapidShare’s software system was 
‘engineered, disseminated, and promoted explicitly for the purpose of facilitating piracy of copyrighted 
[material] and reducing legitimate sales of such [materials] to that extent.’” 
50 See id.   
users’ infringing activity, the district concluded that Perfect 10 is not likely to succeed on 
the merit.  Thus, the district court denied Perfect 10’s motion for preliminary injunction. 
The file-hosting service, RapidShare, was not liable to infringement because 
RapidShare had a substantial number of lawful uses, actively and independently removed 
infringing materials, and promptly removed infringing materials in response to the 
takedown notice from the copyright owners.  It demonstrated the importance of the host’s 
cooperation with the copyright owners and its actively policing of the infringing 
activities.  Therefore, to avoid liability, the host will have to actively police infringing 
activities on its site.  
6. Liability of Video Sharing Website 
The Digital Millennia Copyright Act (“DMCA”) offers a series of safe harbors 
that allow qualifying service providers to limit their liability for claims of copyright 
infringement based upon (a) “transitory digital network communications,” (b) “system 
caching,” (c) “information residing on systems or networks at the direction of users,” and 
(d) “information location tools.”51  To be protected by any one of the safe harbors, one 
must in fact be a “service provider,” defined as “a provider of online services or network 
access, or the operator of facilities therefor.”52  A qualifying service provider must satisfy 
“condition of eligibility,” including the adoption and reasonable implementation of a 
policy that “provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscriber and 
account holders of the service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers,” 
and “accommodates and does not interfere with standard technical measures” that are 
                                                            
51 17 U.S.C. 512(a)-(d) 
52 17 U.S.C. 512(k)(1)(B) 
“used by copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works.”53  Moreover, a 
qualifying service provider must satisfy the requirements of a specific safe harbor. 
A third kind of file sharing technology is the video sharing website such as 
YouTube.  YouTube permits registered users to upload and view video clips for free.  
During the registration process, the users are required to accept YouTube’s Terms of Use 
agreement, which states that the user “will not submit material that is copyrighted … 
unless he is the owner of such rights or has permission from their rightful owner to post 
the material and to grant YouTube all of the license rights granted herein.”54  YouTube 
makes one or more exact copies of the video in its original file format.  During the 
transcoding process, YouTube makes one or more additional copies of the video in 
“Flash” format.  When users request playback of a video, the content is streamed to the 
user’s computer.  YouTube also uses a computer algorithm to identify and recommend 
clips that are related to a video the user watches.
55
 
The Second Circuit held that 17 U.S.C. 512 (c)(1)(A) requires knowledge or 
awareness of facts or circumstances that indicate specific and identifiable instances of 
infringement.
56
  The record raises material issues of fact regarding YouTube’s actual 
knowledge or awareness of specific instances of infringement.
57
  Because of numerous 
instances point to the direction that YouTube might actually knew about specific 
instances of infringement, The Second Circuit vacated the summary judgment granted to 
                                                            
53 17 U.S.C. 512(i). 
54 See Viacom international v. YouTube, 676 F.3d 19, 28 (2nd Cir. 2012). 
55 See id. 
56 See id. at 32. 
57 See id. at 33-34.  For example, Patrick Walker, director of video partnerships for Google and YouTube, 
requested that any “clearly infringing, official broadcast footage” from a list of top Premier League clubs 
be taken down in advance of a meeting with the heads of “several major sports teams and leagues.” 
YouTube ultimately decided not to make a bid for the Premier League rights, but the infringing content 
allegedly remained on the website. 
YouTube and remanded the case for further proceeding on whether “any specific 
infringements of which YouTube had knowledge or awareness correspond to the clips-in-
suit in these actions.”58 
The Second Circuit held that the willful blindness doctrine may be applied to 
demonstrate knowledge or awareness of specific instances of infringement under 
512(c)(1)(A).  17 U.S.C. 512 (m) provides that safe harbor protection shall not be 
conditioned on “a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts 
indicating infringing activity, except to the extent consistent with a standard technical 
measure complying with the provisions of subsection (i).”  The Second Circuit reasoned 
that a common law principle is abrogated only if the statute “speaks directly to the 
question addressed by the common law.”  Because the statute does not “speak directly” to 
the willful blindness doctrine, section 512(m) only limits the doctrine but does not 
abrogate it.
59
 
The Second Circuit concluded that the “right and ability to control” infringing 
activity under 512(c)(1)(B) “requires something more than the ability to remove or block 
access to materials posted on a service provider’s website.”  However, the case law does 
not provide how to define the “something more” that is required.  Some cases involve a 
service provider exerting substantial influence on the activities of users, without 
necessarily acquiring knowledge of specific infringing activity.  Thus, this issue is 
remanded to the district court for further proceeding.
60
 
The Second Circuit concluded that 512(c) covers service providers including 
YouTube.  The broader definition of “the term ‘service provider’ means a provider of 
                                                            
58 See id. 
59 See id. at 35. 
60 See id. at 38. 
online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor, and includes an 
entity described in subparagraph (A).”  Because of the absence of a limitation on the 
ability of a service provider to modify user-submitted content, 512(c) covers more than 
mere electronic storage lockers.
61
  Upon reviewing the record, the Second Circuit held 
that three of the YouTube software functions - replication, playback, and the related 
video feature – occur “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user” within the 
meaning of 17 U.S.C. 512(c)(1).  However, further factfinding regarding the syndication 
of YouTube videos to third parties is required.
62
 
In Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, the Second Circuit held that CSC holdings 
(“Cablevision”) was not liable for direct infringement.  First, the court found that the 
work was embodied in the buffer because every second of an entire work was placed, one 
second at a time, in the buffer.  However, the data did not remain in any buffer for more 
than 1.2 seconds and the data was quickly and automatically overwritten as soon as it was 
processed, so the work were embodied in the buffer for only a “transitory” period.  Thus, 
the work was not “fixed” in this case.63 
Second, the court concluded that copies made by the RS-DVR system were made 
by the customer, and Cablevision’s contribution to this “reproduction by providing the 
system does not warrant the imposition of direct liability.”  The court based its 
conclusion on “by selling access to a system that automatically produces copies on 
                                                            
61 See id. at 39. 
62 See id. at 39-40.  “Transcoding involves ‘making copies of a video in a different encoding scheme’ in 
order to render the video ‘viewable over the Internet to most users.’”  “The playback process involves 
‘delivering copies of YouTube videos to a user’s browser cache’ in response to a user request.”  The 
related videos function’s “indexing and display of related videos retain a sufficient causal link to the prior 
storage of those videos.”  Its “algorithm ‘is fully automated and operates solely in response to user input 
without the active involvement of YouTube employees.’”  Thus, the Second Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s ruling that these three software functions are protected by the 512(c) safe harbor. 
63 See Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 129-130 (2nd Cir. 2008). 
command, Cablevision more closely resembles a store proprietor who charges customers 
to use a photocopier on his premises, and it seems incorrect to say, without more, that 
such a proprietor ‘makes’ any copies when his machines are actually operated by his 
customers.”  Thus, Cablevision did not make the playback copies.64 
Third, the court held that the transmissions were not performances to the public.  
To determine whether the performances were to the public, the court examined “who 
precisely is ‘capable of receiving’ a particular transmission of a performance.”  The court 
concluded that the transmissions were not performances to the public because each RS-
DVR playback transmission was made to a single subscriber using a single unique copy 
produced by that subscriber.
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It appears that the Cartoon Network case may help video-sharing website such as 
YouTube to avoid direct liability.  However, YouTube’s uploading process may not fit 
the holding articulated by the Second Circuit in Cartoon Network.  First, YouTube stores 
copies of the video uploaded by the users in its server.  Thus, it cannot say that the copies 
were not “fixed” for more than a transitory period.  Second, YouTube broadcasts the 
video contents to its users (both registered and not registered).  In contrast, each RS-DVR 
playback transmission was made to a single subscriber using a single unique copy 
produced by that subscriber.  Therefore, the transmission may likely constitute a public 
performance. 
However, the YouTube may be able to say it did not make copies.  The copies 
were made at the users’ requests because when users upload the videos, YouTube website 
triggers a series of automated software functions.  Similarly, in the Cartoon Network, 
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when users issue “a command directly to a system, which automatically obeys commands 
and engages in no volitional conduct.”  Therefore, one may conclude that YouTube did 
not engage in volitional conduct.  
7. Liability of User 
Users play a very important role in using file sharing.  Not only because there 
must be users to use the file sharing systems, but also how the users use the file sharing 
systems often, if not always, determine whether copyright infringement exists.  Also, 
there are two kinds of users: the downloader and the uploader.  Are downloaders and 
uploaders equal?  Do pure downloaders have fair use defense? 
The Napster case dealt with the issue of whether Napster users entitled to the fair 
use defense.  The opinion covered both the uploaders and the downloaders.  Napster 
identified three specific alleged fair uses: sampling, where the users temporarily copied 
the music before purchasing; space-shifting, where users listened to the music that they 
already purchased in CD format; and permissive distribution of music by both 
independent and established artists.  However, the Ninth Circuit first went through the 
fair use factors: “(1) purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted 
work; (3) the ‘amount and substantiality of the portion used’ in relation to the work as a 
whole; (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for the work or the value of the 
work.”  The Ninth Circuit then affirmed the district court’s rejection of the alleged 
sampling and space-shifting fair uses, and the plaintiffs did not seek to enjoin the 
permissive distribution of music by independent and established artists.
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The “purpose and character of the use” requires the determination of whether the 
allegedly infringing use is commercial or noncommercial.  Direct economic benefit is not 
required to show a commercial use.  Commercial use may be found if repeated and 
exploitative copying of copyrighted works occurs, even if the copies are not offered for 
sale.
67
  Napster’s users were engaging in commercial use of the copyrighted works 
because (1) the uploaders were not engaging in personal use; they were distributing 
copyrighted work without permission and (2) the downloaders got for free the music that 
they would ordinarily have to buy.
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The “nature of the use” factor focuses on whether the works are creative in nature.  
If the works are creative in nature, then they are “closer to the core of intended copyright 
protection” than are more fact-based works.  Because the plaintiffs’ copyrighted musical 
compositions and sound recordings are creative in nature, it weighs against a finding of 
fair use.
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The “amount of the portion used” factor focuses on the amount of the portion of 
the copyrighted works are used.  Copying the entire work weighs against a finding of fair 
use although it does not preclude fair use per se.  Because file transfer between Napster 
users involves transferring the entire copyrighted work, it weighs against a finding of fair 
use.
70
 
The “effect of use on market” factor focuses on whether the copying materially 
impairs the marketability of the work, which is copied.
71
  This factor also weighed 
against a finding of fair use in Napster.  The evidence showed that Napster materially 
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impaired the market for the copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings by 
“reducing CD sales among college students” and “raising barriers to plaintiffs’ entry into 
the market for digital downloading of music.
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of Napster’s fair uses: 
sampling and space-shifting.  Based on the evidence, the court determined that Napster 
had adverse effects on the sales of audio CD and the developing digital download market.  
Plaintiffs controlled free promotional downloads on the Internet.  They collected royalties 
on song samples available on retail Internet websites.  Free downloads offered by the 
plaintiffs consisted of thirty-sixty second samples or are full songs programmed to expire 
in a short time.  In contrast, free downloads from Napster were a full, free and permanent 
copy of the songs.  Thus, the purpose and character of sampling was commercial.
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In addition to sampling, space-shifting was also rejected by the court.  Napster 
argued that space-shifting is fair use because users accessed the mp3 version of the songs 
that they already owned in CD format.  However, the fatal flaw of this argument was that 
once the songs were listed on the Napster system, the songs would be available to 
millions of others, not just the CD owner.
74
  Therefore, listing a song on the Napster 
system was essentially distributing the song to the world without permission of the 
copyright owners. 
With discussion as to the fair use defense in the Napster case, we could analyze 
whether the fair use defense is available to the users of file-hosting service and video-
sharing website.  Let us address the situation for the uploaders first.  When a user uploads 
a copyrighted work such as a movie without permission onto either a file-hosting service 
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or a video-sharing website, the user immediately infringes at least the reproduction right 
and the distribution right of the copyright owner.  The uploaded movie would be 
available to other users of the file-hosting service or the video-sharing website.  Thus, the 
users who upload copyrighted work will unlikely have a fair use defense. 
There are users who only download copyrighted work from the file-hosting 
service or watch copyrighted movies on video-sharing website; they never upload any 
copyrighted works onto the file-hosting service or the video-sharing website.  At first, it 
appears that they might have a fair use defense because their use of the copyrighted 
contents is personal use.  However, according to Napster, the downloaders “get for free 
something they would ordinarily have to buy.”  Also, the downloading will most likely 
adversely affect the sale of the movie in DVD, Blu-ray, and Internet streaming format.  
Therefore, the pure downloaders will unlikely have a fair use defense. 
8. Conclusion 
With the foregoing discussion of case law involving the liability of the P2P file 
sharing software distributor, the host of the file-hosting service, the owner of the video-
sharing website, and their users, there are several important features that determine 
whether one is liable for copyright infringement.  If the distributor, host, or owner of the 
service have knowledge about the infringing activity and failed to police the infringing 
activities, then they are liable to at least contributory infringement according to the 
current case law.  The users who upload and/or download the copyrighted materials from 
these services without permission from the copyright owner will likely have no fair use 
defense and be liable for copyright infringement. 
As the Internet technology continues to evolve, the clashes between technology 
and copyright laws will surely continue.  Perhaps, in the near future, the copyright laws 
might have to be reformed to accurately perform its function to “promote the progress of 
science….”   
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